Second, social contract theories are drawn towards certain party representations in order to determine the electoral situation. However, this objective of determination may lead to the elimination of the pluralism of the parties, which was originally the impetus for the award of contracts. In his lectures on the history of political philosophy, Rawls tells us that “a normalization of the interests attributed to parties” is “common to the doctrines of social contracts” and that it is necessary to unite the perspectives of the different parties in order to build a “common position” (2007, 226). Here, Rawls seems to indicate that it is necessary to “normalize” the parties` perspectives in order to reach a determination in the contractual process. Any presentation of the parties` reasoning has two elements that must be clarified: 1) doxastic and 2) evaluative. When these elements are combined, a complete model is created that indicates how and why the representatives of the contract model opt for or accept a set of social rules. The first (doxastic) is the specification of everything that the representatives in the original position know or at least believe. Choice in the contractual model in the broadest sense is an attempt by the parties to choose a set of rules that they expect to be better than in a basic condition, such as. B “generalized egoism” (Rawls, 1999:127), a “state of nature” (Hobbes 1651) or the rules they currently have (Binmore, 2005; Buchanan 2000 ,1975). To do this, they need representations of the base and state of the world under the candidates` rules). Without one of these doxastic representations, the selection problem would be indefinite.
Rawls is known to impose strict doxastic restrictions on his parts of the social contract by imposing a thick veil of ignorance that eliminates information about each individual`s specific details and the world in which he lives. James Buchanan places a similar but less restrictive “veil of uncertainty” on his representative voters (Buchanan and Tullock 1965 [1962]; Buchanan, 1975; see also Rawls, 1958). Since the problem of justification is at the center, the second aspect of contemporary social contract thinking seems to take its place: its dependence on hypothetical agreement models. The aim is to model citizens` reasons, and that is why we ask them what they would agree on under conditions where their agreements should continue their reasons. Significantly, contemporary contract theory is doubly hypothetical. Certainly, no eminent theorist believes that questions of justification are clarified by an actual survey of attitudes towards existing social arrangements and are only clarified when such a survey has been carried out. So the question is not: “Are these agreements currently the subject of a real agreement between citizens?” (If that were the question, the answer would usually be “no.”) Rather, the question is, “Would these rules be agreed upon if citizens were consulted?” Although both questions are somehow likely to be read empirically, only the latter is at stake in today`s theorization. The Treaty is still hypothetical today, at least in this first sense. The normative social contract advocated by Rousseau in Le Contrat social (1762) aims to respond to this sad state of affairs and to remedy the social and moral grievances caused by the development of society. The distinction between history and justification, between the real situation of humanity and how it should live together, is of paramount importance to Rousseau. While we should not ignore the history or causes of the problems we face, we must solve these problems through our ability to decide how we should live.
Maybe he will never do justice, no matter how many times he claims he can. Property played a key role in Locke`s argument in favor of civil government and the treaty that established it. According to Locke, private property is born when a person mixes his work with nature`s raw materials. For example, if you cultivate a piece of land in nature and turn it into a piece of arable land that produces food, then you claim to own that piece of land and the food produced on it. (This led Locke to conclude that America did not really belong to the natives who lived there because, in his opinion, they did not use the basic material of nature. In other words, they didn`t cultivate it, so they had no legitimate right to it, and so others could rightly appropriate it.) Given the implications of natural law, there are limits to the amount of property one can possess: one should not take away from nature more than one can use, so that others do not have enough for themselves. .